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Power	 shifts	 at	 the	 global	 level	 are	 creating	 a	 more	 diverse	
international	 order,	 in	 which	 emerging	 and	 resurgent	 players	
pursue	 and	 assert	 their	 own	 interests.	 While	 it	 is	 not	 clear	




All	major	 (and	minor)	 powers	 are	 facing	 challenges	 of	 economic	 growth,	 energy	 security,	 and	
environmental	sustainability,	all	of	which	are	intimately	interconnected	and	which	no	nation	can	
successfully	confront	on	its	own.	Moreover,	the	pace	at	which	change	is	occurring	is	accelerating,	
requiring	 decision	makers	 to	move	 faster	 at	 the	 very	 time	 that	 problems	 are	 becoming	more	





Effective	global	 governance	 is	difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible,	when	
a	 new	 international	 order	 is	 emerging.	 The	 emergence	 of	
powers	such	as	China,	India,	and	Brazil	in	conjunction	with	the	
resurgence	of	Russia	and	the	seeming	decline	of	the	United	States	
and	 Europe	 have	 increased	 the	 number	 of	 global	 and	 regional	
players	 (including	 regional	 organizations	 and	 arrangements),	
reducing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 effective	 policy	 coordination	 among	
them.	 Diverging	 interests	 as	 well	 as	 diverse	 perspectives	
on	 how	 to	 approach	 the	 growing	 number	 of	 emerging	 and	
longstanding	 issues	 on	 the	 international	 agenda	 have	 led	 to	
greater	fragmentation	of	world	politics.	As	a	result,	the	prospects	
for	effective	global	governance	–	broadly	defined	as	the	collective	








when established means 
of interaction are being 
undermined.
The prospects for effective 
global governance are 
deteriorating because 
challenges on the global 
agenda are increasing 
in number, scale, and 
complexity at the very time 
that international  and 
national governments are 
being hobbled in their 
capacity to address them.
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Existing	institutions	and	fora	of	global	governance	need	to	adjust	quickly	and	effectively	to	the	









the	 prospects	 for	 more	 effective	 forms	 of	 global	 governance.	 The	 workshop	 aimed	 to	 explore	
challenges,	identify	differences,	find	common	ground,	and	see	whether	participants	could	identify	
and	 agree	 on	 forces	 changing	 the	world,	 and	 outline	 a	 process	 that	would	 allow	narrowing	 of	
the	discourse,	reaching	conclusions	and	creating	an	action	plan.	Participants	represented	next-


















proliferation,	 or	 economic	 crises.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	
there	 was	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 whether	 and	
how	 this	 could	 be	 accomplished,	 primarily	 because	 of	 a	 basic	
paradox:	 challenges	 are	 complex	 and	 interconnected	while	 the	











not	 working	 is	 contributing	 to	 the	 erosion	 of	 its	 effectiveness.	




of	 the	 2009	 Copenhagen	 climate	 summit	 is	 probably	 the	most	
prominent	 example.	 From	 a	 European	 perspective,	 the	 global	
summit	was	 not	 only	 disappointing	 –	 it	was	 a	 diplomatic	 disaster.	Although	Copenhagen	was	
a	 rare	case	of	 the	European	Union	showing	signs	of	global	 leadership	by	having	a	meaningful	





trust	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 international	 system	 to	 successfully	
cope	 with	 emergent	 and	 longstanding	 challenges	 diminished	
significantly.	A	European	participant	at	our	meeting	argued	this	
erosion	 of	 trust	 could	 be	 fatal:	 “The	 liberal	 order	 can	 survive	
marginalization	of	the	United	States,	but	not	the	marginalization	
of	Europe.	Europe	provides	 the	 ideas	 that	 form	 the	 core	 of	 the	
international	system.”
There is a basic paradox: 
challenges are complex 
and interconnected while 
the international system 
appears increasingly 
fragmented.
The mere belief that 
the system of global 
governance is not working 
is contributing to the 
erosion of its effectiveness. 
A sense of foreboding 
about the future that 
defines opinion in many 
parts of the developed 
world, especially in the 
West, risks becoming a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.
“The liberal order can 
survive marginalization 
of the United States, but 
not the marginalization of 
Europe. Europe provides 
the ideas that form the 









Two	distinct	 criticisms	of	 the	 system	of	 global	 governance	emerged	 from	our	discussions.	 The	
first	 is	 a	 somewhat	prosaic	 criticism	 that	 the	 system	 is	not	working	because	 its	 structure	and	
procedures	have	not	kept	pace	with	a	rapidly	changing	world.	As	one	Asian	participant	argued,	










we	 are	 seeing	 “the	 emergence	 of	 alternative	 ideologies	 that	




Our	 participants	 characterized	 this	 split	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways:	
one	 called	 it	 a	 clash	 of	 values	 vs.	 a	 clash	 of	 interests.	Another	
suggested	we	distinguish	between	challenges	for	the	system	and	
challenges	to	the	system.	
The problem is more 
fundamental  … It is not 
who is in charge, but the 
fundamental values and 
operating principles of the 
system. As an American 
participant explained, we 
are seeing “the emergence 
of alternative ideologies 
that threaten Western 
liberalism.”
8 Key Findings
2.2 Incrementalism to the Rescue
Despite	 fears	 that	 the	 international	 system	 is	 not	 working,	 our	 group	 agreed	 that	 no	 radical	
alternative	is	conceivable	or	feasible.	There	are	too	many	vested	interests,	and	problems,	while	







The	 G20	 is	 the	 most	 important	 recent	 innovation	 in	 global	
governance.	This	group	played	a	crucial	role	in	dealing	with	the	
immediate	challenges	posed	by	the	financial	and	economic	crisis.	
Indeed,	 the	 final	declaration	of	 the	September	2009	Pittsburgh	
G20	summit	declared	that	 it	would	become	“the	premier	forum	
for	 our	 international	 economic	 cooperation.”1	 It	 is	 tempting	 to	
conclude	that	its	initial	success	in	managing	this	crisis	resulted	
from	a	genuine	fear	among	G20	members	that	a	global	financial	
breakdown	was	a	very	 real	possibility;	 as	 soon	as	 the	 sense	of	
urgency	 abated,	 diverging	 interests	 reasserted	 themselves	 to	
dominate	 discussions	 and	 frustrate	 action.	 Real	 solutions	 to	
the	world’s	 financial	 problems	 remain	 beyond	 reach,	 and	 even	




in	 other	words,	 that	 a	 coordinated	 and	 coherent	multilateral	 policy	 is	 only	possible	under	 the	
pressure	of	a	global	crisis	that	threatens	to	have	immediate	and	severe	impact	on	a	multitude	of	
domestic	populations.	
A	 second	 avenue	 for	 cooperation	 is	 regional	 institutions	 and	 arrangements.	 There	 is	much	 to	
commend	in	these	mechanisms.	They	are	closer	to	problems	they	are	trying	to	address,	with	a	
better	understanding	of	local	perspectives,	challenges,	resources,	and	dynamics.	They	can	fashion	
solutions	 that	 better	 fit	 local	 needs	 and	minimize	negative	 impacts.	Not	 surprisingly,	 they	 are	
often	seen	as	more	 legitimate	responses	and	can	command	more	respect	 from	individuals	and	
1	 Leaders’	 Statement	 The	Pittsburgh	 Summit,	 September	 24-25	 2009,	 p.	 3;	URL:		 http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_
summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
Global governance is 
in essence global crisis 
management … A 
coordinated and coherent 
multilateral policy is 
only possible under the 
pressure of a global crisis 
that threatens to have 
immediate and severe 
impact on a multitude of 
domestic populations.





The	 growth	 of	 economic,	 environmental,	 and	 security	 inter-
dependence	is	creating	a	demand	for	a	rules-based	international	















It	 draws	 upon	 a	 19th-century	model	 of	 statehood	 –	 ironically,	 a	 European	model	 –	 that	 holds	
national	borders	inviolable	and	seems	quaint	(if	not	outdated)	given	21st-century	communications	






Their	 flaws	 notwithstanding,	 these	 two	 options	 outline	 directions	 in	 which	 the	 international	
system	can	evolve.	
International institutions, in 
many cases, are mutating 
from organizations focused 
on solving problems into 
arenas for waging conflict 
as newly empowered states 















some	 of	 China’s	 neighbors.	 Against	 this	 background,	 the	 idea	
of	 a	 world	 order	 dominated	 by	 a	 G2,	 i.e.,	 an	 informal	 rather	
than	 formal	 joint	 US-Chinese	 leadership	 in	 global	 affairs,	 was	
dismissed	as	unrealistic	by	all.	At	 the	 same	 time,	however,	 the	
development	of	US-China	relations,	was	widely	considered	a	 (if	
not	the)	determinant	of	how	the	international	system	will	evolve.
The	 rise	 of	China	 to	 the	 status	 of	 a	 global	 power	 is	 one	 of	 the	
most	 significant	 events	 of	 the	 early	 21st	 century.	 There	 are,	
however,	striking	differences	 in	how	this	 rise	 is	perceived.	Many	people	 in	 the	US	continue	 to	






appears	 to	 be	 based	 upon	 notions	 of	 geostrategic	 interests	 and	 great	 power	 rivalries	 deriving	












A world order dominated 
by informal rather than 
formal joint US-Chinese 
leadership was dismissed 
as unrealistic by all. At the 
same time, however, the 
development of US-China 
relations, was widely 
considered a (if not the) 
determinant of how the 




created	by	its	rise,	 that	 its	 leaders	have	studied	history	and	appreciate	the	tensions	created	by	






In	 contrast	 to	 the	US,	Europe	–	 the	EU	as	well	 as	 its	member	 states	–	has	 fewer	 geostrategic	
and	 security	 concerns	 in	 Asia.	 After	 the	withdrawal	 of	 colonial	 powers	 from	Asia	 after	 1945,	
Europe	has	re-engaged	Asian	countries	in	an	effort	to	strengthen	economic	and	cultural	ties.	Some	
Europeans	applaud	the	rise	of	China	as	a	counterbalance	to	US	dominance;	some,	including	some	









Pick	 a	 dimension	 –	 size	 of	 state,	 population,	 GDP,	 GDP	 per	 capita,	 type	 of	 government,	 type	






Japan	 ‘rose’	 in	 the	 ‘60s	 and	 ‘70s,	 the	 Asian	 Tigers	 (Hong	 Kong,	 Singapore,	 South	 Korea	 and	










no	matter	how	big,	can	undo	 the	entire	 international	system	on	 its	own;	 it	must	have	allies	or	
similarly	inclined	diplomatic	partners.	Asian	intellectuals	have	suggested	that	such	a	mass	exists.	













the	 “rise	 of	 Asia,”	 in	 our	 view,	 this	 distinction	 does	 not	 really	
matter,	because	these	fears	are	as	 imprecise	and	elusive	as	the	
term	 “Asia.”	 Indeed,	 a	 clear-eyed	 assessment	 of	 the	 anxiety	
triggered	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 Asia	would	 note	 that	 “the	 problem”	 is	
not	 just	 the	 rise	of	China	but	 the	prospect	of	 a	world	 in	which	
Western	dominance	has	ended.	It	is	“the	rise	of	the	rest”	and	the	
resulting	 loss	 of	Western	 privilege	 that	 generates	 anxiousness.	















A clear-eyed assessment 
of the anxiety triggered by 
the rise of Asia would note 
that “the problem” is not 
just the rise of China but 
the prospect of a world in 
which Western dominance 
has ended. It is “the rise of 
the rest” and the resulting 
loss of Western privilege 
that generates anxiousness.
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There	 is	 no	mistaking	Chinese	 dissatisfactions	with	 the	 existing	 system	 of	 global	 governance,	






















In	 the	West,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 that	 rising	 powers	 are	 not	 being	
held	 accountable	 nor	 are	 they	 ready	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	
global	governance.	Once	again,	China	is	at	the	forefront	of	those	





instead	 of	 trying	 to	 strengthen	 institutional	 capacity	 or	 playing	
by	 the	 rules	 of	 international	 institutions.	 In	 this	 view,	 the	 key	




In the West, there is a 
sense that rising powers 
are not being held 
accountable nor are they 
ready to take responsibility 
for global governance  … 
At the core of this criticism 
is the free rider problem: 
rising powers are blamed 
for taking advantage of 
the international system, 
playing an increasingly 
important role within it, 
but are unwilling to share 





raises	 several	problems.	First,	 if	 this	 is	 indeed	a	 ‘Western”	description,	 then	 it	 is	 implied	 that	











proponents	of	 this	notion	have	sought	 to	 legitimize	armed	humanitarian	 intervention	under	 the	
concept	of	“the	responsibility	to	protect”,	thus	weakening	the	norm	of	sovereignty	by	making	it	
conditional	on	states’	conduct	and	protection	of	human	rights.	While	Asian	states,	including	China,	










increasingly	 unrealistic.	 That	 process	 is	 complemented	 and	
accelerated	by	technologies	that	enable	and	empower	new	actors.	










Sovereignty is a key issue 
for any reform of the 
international system and 
effective global governance 
may be impossible without 
modifications of it.
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In	 addition	 to	 divergent	 attitudes	 toward	 sovereignty,	 European	
anxieties	 about	 the	 “rise	 of	 Asia”	 are	 fueled	 by	 the	 fear	 that	
Europe’s	 role	 in	 the	 international	 system	 is	 as	 contested	as	 that	
of	 Asia.	 The	 shift	 in	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 from	 the	 Atlantic	 to	
the	Pacific	Ocean	seems	 to	come	at	Europe’s	expense.	Although	
the	 institutional	 provisions	 in	 the	 Lisbon	 treaty	 to	 strengthen	
EU	 foreign	 policy	 are	 ambitious,	 Europe’s	 future	 role	 in	 global	





























with	ASEAN	 is	not	 just	about	convergence	of	norms,	but	 the	 fact	 that	ASEAN	 is	an	 important	
forum	for	China,	Japan	and	South	Korea	to	engage	each	other.”	
European anxieties about 
the “rise of Asia” are fueled 
by the fear that Europe’s 
role in the international 
system is as contested as 
that of Asia. The shift in 
the balance of power from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific 







2.4 Agents of Change
As	 international	 relations	 become	 more	 diverse	 and	 complex,	
power	is	not	only	shifting	from	established	to	emerging	countries,	
but	 also	 toward	 individuals	 and	 non-state	 actors.	 Modern	





the	 individual	 are	 being	 rebalanced	by	 information	 technology,	
the	state	 remains	 the	central	 actor	 in	 the	 international	 system.	
While	states	may	not	be	as	effective	in	implementing	change	as	




actors	 as	 agents	 of	 positive	 change.	 The	 growing	 importance	
and	 impact	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 international	 politics	 is	 one	
distinctive	 political	 development.	 Transnational	 nongovernmental	 organizations	 (NGOs),	 civil	
society	 groups,	 social	 entrepreneurs,	 faith-based	 organizations,	multinational	 corporations	 and	
other	business	bodies,	as	well	as	trans-sectoral	public	policy	networks	are	increasingly	effective	










While relations between 
the state and the individual 
are being rebalanced 
… the state remains 
the central actor in the 
international system. 
While states may not be as 
effective in implementing 
change as in the past, they 
are extremely effective 
in blocking reform or 
adaptation. Thus, the key 
to affecting change is 
identifying ways to move 





other	 civil	 society	organizations	 (CSOs)	 in	 international	politics	provides	examples	of	 effective	
collaboration	 with	 national	 governments	 and	 intergovernmental	 institutions.	 This	 is	 a	 mutual	
process:	 a	 strong	 international	 system	 reinforces	 the	 actions	 of	NGOs	and	 similar	groups.	 The	
growing	number	and	proliferation	of	CSOs	and	social	entrepreneurs	 in	the	 international	policy	
arena	 reflects	 the	 steady	 increase	 in	 resources	 from	 governments,	 international	 institutions,	
















of	 values,	 opinions,	 and	 interests	 ranging	 across	 the	 political	
spectrum.	 All	 too	 often,	 this	 universe	 resembles	 the	 Tower	 of	
Babel,	displaying	a	high	degree	of	 fragmentation	that	 limits	 its	
effectiveness	 and	undermines	 its	 legitimacy.	 In	 addition,	CSOs	
are	 not	 exclusively	 norm-driven	 actors	 but	 organizations	 that	
pursue	 self-interested	 strategies	 to	 ensure	 their	 institutional	
survival,	 often	 competing	 with	 each	 other	 for	 influence	 and	
funding.	In	other	words:	lines	of	conflict	among	actors	of	global	
civil	society	are	multiple	and	shifting.	Given	this	diversity	and	





Thus,	 a	 central	 issue	 in	 the	 discussion	 of	 agents	 of	 change	 is	 leadership.	 Any	 government,	
international	 institution	or	 individual	political	 leader	willing	and	capable	of	exercising	genuine	
leadership	 could	 be	 an	 agent	 of	 change.	 Hence,	 it	 was	 no	 surprise	 that	 there	 was	 an	 almost	
unanimous	agreement	among	workshop	participants	on	the	necessity	for	a	new	kind	of	leadership	
to	 foster	a	more	effective	 international	system	–	 leadership	 that	can	address	global	 issues	and	
engage	the	necessary	stakeholders	long	enough	to	produce	sustainable	solutions.	Yet	there	was	
no	 agreement	 on	how	 to	 define	 leadership,	 how	 to	 promote	 it,	 and	how	 to	 distinguish	 it	 from	
power.	Consequently,	there	was	no	consensus	on	how	to	overcome	the	alleged	lack	of	leadership	
in	 international	 affairs.	 The	 fundamental	 problem	 is	 that	 leaders	 are	 accountable	 to	 domestic	
constituencies.	Yet	the	solution	of	international	problems	requires	power,	authority,	and	influence	
beyond	national	borders.	How	do	 leaders	engage	 individuals	when	their	authority	 is	so	clearly	




There was no agreement on 
how to define leadership, 
how to promote it, and 
how to distinguish it from 
power. Consequently, there 
was no consensus on how 
to overcome the alleged 
lack of leadership in 
international affairs.
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This	 raises	 the	 issue	 of	 US	 leadership.	 As	 long	 as	 emerging	
powers	 are	 not	 willing	 and	 Europe	 is	 not	 able	 to	 provide	
leadership	 at	 the	 international	 level,	 the	 US	 remains	 the	 only	
candidate,	notwithstanding	the	many	challenges	it	faces.	Yet,	its	










In the absence of proactive 
political leadership on 
an international scale, in 
all likelihood, crises will 
continue to serve as the 




not	entirely	suited	 to	 the	21st	century.	Existing	 institutions	and	





Recent	 attempts	 by	 the	 international	 community	 to	 address	
problems	like	climate	change,	environmental	pollution,	financial	
regulatory	reform,	trade	policy,	nuclear	non-proliferation,	global	
free	 trade,	 and	 energy	 security	 have	 failed.	 This	 realization	 is	
intensified	by	the	perception	that	time	is	running	out.	Problems	
are	outpacing	the	capacity	of	the	international	system	to	cope.	While	we	applaud	the	spread	of	









The	 new	 configuration	 of	 international	 relations	 is,	 by	 and	 large,	 inherently	 chaotic	 and	







of	actions	 if	and	when	 they	do.	But	 this	 is	not	a	world	 in	which,	as	 Ian	Bremmer	and	Nouriel	






There is little indication 
that leaders and thinkers 
have anticipated the impact 
of the creation of a global 
middle class in a world of 
limited resources. As one 
participant suggested, 
perhaps it is time to start 
















pulls	 and	 tugs	 that	 can	align	nations	and	 facilitate	 cooperation	










concentrating	 on	 specific	 issues.	 The	 leadership	 exercised	 by	




issues	 are	 an	 appropriate	 organizational	 structure	 for	 today’s	
world.	 Non-state	 actors,	 especially	 NGOs,	 social	 entrepreneurs	
and	civil	society	groups,	can	play	an	 important	role	 in	creating	
these	kinds	of	networks	that	span	geographical,	institutional,	and	




Even in a world without 
powerful organizing 
forces, there are magnetic 
pulls and tugs that 
can align nations and 
facilitate cooperation and 
collaborative efforts. Let’s 
call this “weak polarity” 
… In the absence of a 
comprehensive, unitary 
approach to global 
governance, new forms 
of leadership will emerge, 
not as enduring as 
traditional alliances or 
international institutions, 
but rather patchworks of 
overlapping, often ad hoc 
and fragmented efforts, 
involving shifting coalitions 
of state and non-state 
actors concentrating on 
specific issues. 
8	 Dr.	Henry	A.	Kissinger,	Keynote	Address	for	the	8th	IISS	Global	Strategic	Review	“Global	Security	Governance	and	the	Emerging	


















contribute	to	global	public	goods	without	sacrificing	their	 fundamental	 interests	 in	sovereignty	





and	US	 and	 emerging	 countries	 are	 essential.	 This	 applies	not	
only	 to	 the	US	and	China	–	although	 this	bilateral	 relationship	
will	be	pivotal	for	the	entire	world	–	but	also	to	Europe	and	Asia.	
As	the	discussions	in	Berlin	crystallized,	there	is	an	urgent	need	




to	 keep	 pace	with	 the	 agendas	 discussed	 in	 the	myriad	 policy	
dialogues	and	track	II	forums	in	the	Asia-Pacific	community.	
A policy community 
between Europe and Asia 
beyond the formal Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) is 
needed to keep pace with 
the agendas discussed in 
the myriad policy dialogues 










questions	 as	 well	 as	 on	 emerging	 issues	 that	 transcend	 traditional	 concerns.	 Of	 particular	
importance	is	the	growing	influence	of	 innovative	technologies,	such	as	the	internet	and	social	
media	 that	have	 the	capacity	 to	destabilize	and	disrupt	 the	 international	system.	Likewise,	 the	
concept	of	global	public	goods	and	the	sharing	of	the	burdens	to	create	and	maintain	them	are	of	
paramount	importance.	
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This	 report	 has	 benefited	 tremendously	 from	 the	 contributions	 of	 all	 those	 who	 participated	







































































Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System
A Trilateral Practitioners Workshop – Berlin, July 7-8, 2011
At	the	Global	Policy	Council	hosted	by	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	in	Berlin	in	2009,	Henry	Kissinger	
declared	 that	“We	will	be	 forced	 to	 -	and	we	should	anyway	–	 think	about	a	new	 international	











































































of	Americans	and	Asian	 in	global	governance?		What	 futures	can	we	envision:	 is	 there	a	world	
without	the	West?	Is	the	transatlantic	concept	relevant	to	the	future?	Where	does	Asia	lie	in	the	
new	global	order?	Was	US	global	leadership	ever	real?	What	is	its	future?	What	is	the	meaning	
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